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In this study, we examined the effects of response consensuality in syllogistic reasoning on patterns 
of answer change by using the two-response paradigm. Participants evaluated 24 syllogistic 
problems previously found to differ in consensuality, including consensually correct (CC), 
consensually wrong (CW), and nonconsensual (NC) items. Each problem was presented two times 
and participants were required to provide an initial quick answer to the first presentation, to rethink 
the problem, and to provide their second and final response without time limits to the second 
presentation. Participants reported the feeling-of-rightness (FOR) following the initial response, and 
the final judgment of confidence (FJC) after the final response. Following the assumptions of 
Koriat's (2012) Self-Consistency Model of confidence, we expected higher probability of answer 
change for initial nonconsensual responses than for initial consensual responses. The results showed 
that patterns of answer change, as well as metacognitive judgments and response times, were related 
to item consensus and response consensuality. Nonconsensual responses were more likely to be 
changed than consensual responses, and the probability of answer change correlated negatively with 
item consensus. Faster response times and higher FORs and FJCs were obtained for consensual and 
consistent responses than for nonconsensual and inconsistent responses. The obtained results 
indicate that answer change may in part be a consequence of random fluctuations in representation 
sampling, or in generating evidence that supports each of the two response options.  
 












Two-response paradigm, introduced by Thompson and her colleagues 
(Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), 
is used to explore the relationships between quick intuitive responses (Type 1) and 
deliberate responses (Type 2) to reasoning tasks. The paradigm requires participants 
to provide two responses to a series of reasoning problems. First, they are asked to 
provide an initial quick answer to a reasoning problem. Second, immediately after 
the initial response is given, the problem is presented again, and participants are 
allowed to rethink the problem and to provide a second and final response without 
time limits. After each response is provided, participants report their confidence in 
response accuracy. Confidence following the initial response is labelled feeling-of-
rightness (FOR), and confidence given after the final response is labelled final 
judgment of confidence (FJC) (Thompson et al., 2011; see also Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2015, 2017). 
Research using the two-response paradigm revealed some important findings, 
with clear theoretical implications for the psychology of reasoning, and in particular 
for dual-process accounts of reasoning (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Sloman, 1996; Thompson, 2009). As it was suggested by the Metacognitive 
Reasoning Theory (Thompson et al., 2011; see also Thompson, 2009), metacognitive 
feelings about the accuracy of initial responses determine the amount of Type 2 
engagement. Therefore, lower FOR accompanying initial responses should be 
associated with higher probability of answer change and with longer rethinking 
times. Both assumptions are strongly supported by the experimental findings (Bago 
& De Neys, 2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; 
Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2013; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, it was found that, in general, reasoners are reluctant to 
change their initial responses, even if those responses are incorrect. Typically, the 
same response is given in a subsequent presentation of an item in more than 70% of 
trials, and in some studies this percentage is about 90% (e. g., Bago & De Neys, 
2017). At the trial level, the combinations of two responses can be classified into four 
categories with respect to their accuracy. Bago & De Neys (2017) labelled these four 
categories of responses as 00, 01, 10, and 11. The first number indicates the accuracy 
of the first response, and the second number indicates the accuracy of the second 
response. Therefore, category 00 includes trials on which both responses were 
incorrect, category 01 includes trials on which the first response was incorrect and 
the second response was correct, etc. Trials on which the initial response is changed 
typically comprise of similar number of changes from initial incorrect responses to 
final correct responses (01 category) and changes from initial correct responses to 
final incorrect responses (10 category). As a consequence, accuracy of final 
responses is not substantially higher than accuracy of initial responses.   
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One important problem concerns the conditions which affect the likelihood of 
answer change. Previous studies have demonstrated that initial responses were more 
likely to be changed when a) they were followed by lower FOR, b) they were not 
generated fluently, and c) they were given to conflict problems which cue two 
different responses, one normatively correct and the other believable but incorrect 
(Bago & De Neys, 2017; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al., 2011). 
However, besides conflict/no conflict manipulations little is known about the 
properties of reasoning problems that could affect the probability of answer change 
and the direction of that change. The question is which factors determine whether 
initial incorrect answers will be corrected after rethinking, and which factors affect 
the probability of change of an initial correct response to a final incorrect response. 
In this study, we explored self-consistency as a possible factor that affects the 
probability of answer change and the direction of that change.  
 
Self-Consistency Model of Confidence 
 
Our predictions are based on Koriat's (2012) Self-Consistency Model of 
confidence (SCM). According to the SCM, when answering two-alternative forced 
choice questions (2AFC), people randomly sample the representations that are 
outputs of the cognitive processes involved in the decision about the options. The 
decision about the options is based on the outcome of the sampling process. The 
option supported by stronger evidence, or a larger number of representations 
favouring the option, is chosen. Since response decisions are based on small samples 
of representations derived from the item-specific pool of representations, variations 
in responding reflect, in part, random fluctuations in the sampling process. 
Furthermore, confidence assigned to the chosen option is based on the hypothetical 
cue labelled self-consistency. Self-consistency represents overall agreement among 
sampled representations, or, the proportion of representations favouring the selected 
option.  
Two important predictions are related to this account. First, the population of 
representations associated with an item is shared among people, as long as we assume 
that there are common experiences and processes that underlie decisions about the 
options. Various items used to test human memory, knowledge, and judgments, 
typically differ reliably in item consensus or the proportion of participants who chose 
the consensual option. For binary choices, item consensus can vary between 50% 
and 100%. There is strong empirical evidence that confidence correlates with item 
consensus, and that it is higher for consensual responses (options chosen by the 
majority of participants) than for nonconsensual responses. Accordingly, when the 
consensual response to an item is incorrect, confidence for this answer is higher than 
for the correct one. Second, since it is assumed that on each presentation of an item 
representations are sampled from the same pool of representations associated with 
that item, items should differ in the consistency of responding, or, in the likelihood 




of repeating the same response on subsequent presentations of the item. This within-
person consistency is correlated with confidence. Predictions about the relationships 
between consensuality and confidence, as well as between consistency and 
confidence have strong empirical support (for a review see Koriat, 2012; Koriat & 
Adiv, 2016). It should be also noted that response times track consensuality in a 
similar way as confidence judgments (for details see Koriat, 2012).  
A further prediction of central importance for this study is the prediction about 
the correlation between cross-person consensus and within-person consistency. In a 
series of studies using various tasks including general knowledge questions (Koriat, 
2008), perceptual judgments (Koriat, 2011), personal preferences (Koriat, 2013), 
judgments of category membership (Koriat & Sorka, 2015), attitudinal judgments 
(Koriat & Adiv, 2011), and social beliefs (Koriat & Adiv, 2012), Koriat and his 
colleagues demonstrated that within-person consistency correlated with cross-person 
consensus. The option chosen by the majority of participants on the first presentation 
of an item was more likely to be consistently chosen on subsequent presentations of 
that item. Furthermore, initial responses followed by high confidence judgments 
were more likely to be repeated on subsequent trials. 
 
Consensuality, Consistency, and Answer Change  
 
Findings about the relationships between within-person consistency and cross-
person consensus can be used to examine the patterns of responses in two-response 
paradigm using the conclusion evaluation task in a domain of syllogistic reasoning. 
The main hypothesis of this study is that the probability of answer change in two-
response paradigm should be related to consensuality of initial responses. This 
hypothesis is based on several notions.  
First, conclusion evaluation task is similar to 2AFC questions, since it includes 
two response options. Various items elicit similar rates of acceptances of conclusions 
across studies. For example, acceptance rates for 48 syllogisms reported by 
Bajšanski, Žauhar, and Valerjev (2018) correlated highly with acceptance rates 
reported by Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999). Therefore, 
syllogisms reliably vary in item consensus, and in related proportions of consensual 
and nonconsensual responses. From the perspective of SCM, similar patterns of 
relationships between confidence, consensuality and consistency are expected for 
different contents, as long as the tasks include two response options and reliably vary 
in item consensus.     
Second, in our previous study (Bajšanski et al., 2018, Experiment 1) we showed 
that the basic principles of the SCM are applicable to the data about accuracy, 
confidence and response times obtained with conclusion evaluation task in syllogistic 
reasoning. Three sets of items were constructed. Consensually correct (CC) items 
included easy syllogisms with high accuracy, consensually wrong (CW) items 
included problems with low accuracy, and nonconsensual items (NC) items included 
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problems with accuracy about 50%. It was demonstrated that CC and CW syllogisms 
were evaluated with higher confidence than NC syllogisms and that answers 
endorsed by the majority of participants were given higher confidence ratings than 
answers endorsed by the minority of participants. Therefore, in the set of CC items, 
correct responses were endorsed with higher confidence than incorrect responses, 
whereas in the set of CW items, incorrect responses were endorsed with higher 
confidence than correct responses.  
Third, it can be assumed that changes of responses in two-response paradigm 
could, in part, reflect random fluctuations in representation sampling on two 
presentations of an item and, as a consequence, random fluctuations in decisions 
about the options. Patterns of responses at the trial level can be analysed with respect 
to within-person consistency, with 11 and 00 being the consistent responses, and 10 
and 01 inconsistent responses. An important difference between two-response 
paradigm and Koriat's studies that examined within-person consistency is that two-
response paradigm includes two sets of instructions, one set for the initial response, 
and the other for the final response. Participants are expected to provide the first 
response that comes to mind as their initial response, and to carefully rethink two 
options before they provide the final response. Accordingly, initial and final 
responses differ in response times. However, as long as we assume that responses to 
an item are based on the sampling from the common pool of representations, that the 
choices are based on the strength of evidence favouring each of the two response 
options, and that confidence correlates with consensuality and consistency, the 
probability of answer change should track consensuality of initial response.  
The expected relationship between consensuality and consistency should affect 
probability of answer change of initial responses. We expected a higher probability 
of change of the initial response when it is nonconsensual than when it is consensual. 
As a consequence, for CC items we expected a larger proportion of change for 
incorrect initial responses than for correct initial responses. For CW items we 
expected the opposite, larger proportion of change for correct initial responses than 
for incorrect initial responses. For NC items similar proportions of changes of correct 
and incorrect initial responses were expected.  
Furthermore, similar effects should emerge at the item level. Items with higher 
consensus (higher proportion of consensual response) are expected to have a lower 
probability of answer change of consensual responses than items with lower 
consensus. On the other hand, probability of change of initial nonconsensual 
responses should increase with item consensus.  
Several hypotheses about metacognitive judgments and response times can also 
be derived.  
First, higher FORs and FJCs should be given to consistent responses (categories 
11 and 00) than to inconsistent responses (categories 10 and 01). This effect was 
demonstrated in previous studies using two-response paradigm (Bago & De Neys, 
2017). Second, metacognitive judgments should differ between two subsets of 




consistent responses. More precisely, both FORs and FJCs should be higher for 
consensual consistent responses that for nonconsensual consistent responses. Third, 
differences in FJC given to final inconsistent responses should also depend on the 
response consensuality. When the initial nonconsensual response is changed to 
consensual response, FJC should be higher than when the initial consensual response 
is changed to nonconsensual response. Fourth, response times of the initial and final 
responses should mimic the effects of consensuality and consistency on 
metacognitive judgments. In short, faster response times are expected for consensual 
and consistent responses than for nonconsensual and inconsistent responses.  
To summarize, we examined the patterns of answer change with respect to the 
variables previously found to affect confidence in syllogistic reasoning: item 
consensus and response consensuality. Two-response procedure was used, and 
participants evaluated 24 syllogistic problems previously found to differ in 







Seventy undergraduate psychology students (63 female) from the University of 




Syllogisms. The participants evaluated 24 syllogisms used in our previous study 
(Bajšanski et al., 2018, Experiment 1). The content of the syllogisms consisted of 
professions (e.g., engineer) and pastimes (e.g., mountaineer). Each pair of premises 
contained a unique combination of terms. All conclusions were particular-negative 
conclusions, including Some a are not c and Some c are not a conclusions. Three sets 
of consensus categories of syllogisms were used (CC, NC, CW). Half of the 
syllogisms in each category were valid, and half were invalid. Consensus categories 
systematically differed in accuracy, with CC category including syllogisms with 
accuracy above 60%, NC category including syllogisms with accuracy about 50%, 
and CW category including syllogisms with accuracy below 40% (for the detailed 
description of stimuli see Bajšanski et al., 2018).  
Feeling-of-rightness (FOR). After providing the initial response to each 
problem, the participants made a FOR judgment on a 6-point scale ranging from 50% 
(guessing) to 100% (fully confident). 
Final judgment of confidence (FJC). After providing the final response to 
each problem, the participants made a FJC on a 6-point scale ranging from 50% 
(guessing) to 100% (fully confident). 
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The participants were tested individually. The stimuli presentation and data 
collection were controlled using the E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on a personal computer. At the beginning 
of the test, the instructions were presented on a computer screen. The procedure was 
explained to the participants, and they were told how to give their answers and 
judgments for each task. The two-response procedure was used and the participants 
were informed that they will evaluate each problem two times. In each trial, two 
premises and a conclusion were presented on the screen. The participants were asked 
to assume that all information in the premises was true and to evaluate each 
conclusion. They were instructed to give the initial response, that is, the first response 
that comes to mind, by pressing the YES key if they thought the conclusion followed 
from the premises or the NO key otherwise. After providing the first response, they 
were asked to provide FOR judgment on a six-point scale appearing on the screen 
and ranging from 50% to 100% by pressing the appropriate key (50%, 60%, 70%, 
80%, 90%, 100%). The FOR judgment was followed by the second presentation of 
the same problem and participants were instructed to carefully rethink their response 
without time limit and to provide their final response by pressing the YES or NO 
key. They were additionally instructed that they could change the given initial 
response. After providing the second or final response, they were asked to provide 
FJC on a six-point scale ranging from 50% to 100% by pressing the appropriate key. 
Participants were given as much time as they needed to comprehend the instructions. 
After the instructions, they were given two practice problems. After the two practice 






Direction of Change Categories: Descriptive Data 
 
We analysed the frequencies of direction of change categories. Following Bago 
and DeNeys (2017) we labelled these categories as 00, 01, 10, and 11, where the first 
number indicates the accuracy of the initial response, and the second number 
indicates the accuracy of the final response. Accurate responses included acceptances 
of valid conclusions and rejections of invalid conclusions. Table 1 presents the 
frequencies of direction of change categories for three consensus categories (CC, 
NC, CW). Additionally, for each cell two percentages are reported. The first refers 
to the percentages within consensus categories. The second refers to the percentages 
within each of the first response categories (correct, incorrect). Finally, total 
frequencies of each of the four direction of change categories are presented.  
  




Table 1  
Frequencies of Trials within Consensus Categories and Direction of Change Categories 
Consensus 
category 










CC N 350 51  86 73 
% within CC 62.5% 9.1%  15.4% 13.0% 
% within first response 87.3% 12.7%  54.1% 45.9% 
NC N 202 79  193 86 
% within NC 36.1% 14.1%  34.5% 15.4% 
% within first response 71.9% 29.1%  69.2% 30.8% 
CW N 80 97  351 32 
% within CW 14.3% 17.3%  62.7% 5.7% 
% within first response 45.2% 54.8%  91.6% 8.4% 
Total N 632 227  630 191 
% within total 37.6% 13.5%  37.5% 11.4% 
 
As can be seen, 75.1% of all initial responses were not changed (responses in 
11 and 00 categories) and 24.9% of responses were changed. This is a standard 
finding, that participants are reluctant to change their initial responses (Bago & De 
Neys, 2017). Furthermore, responses in 11 category are most frequent for CC items, 
while responses in 00 category are most common for CW items, as expected.  
We examined the probability of answer change with respect to the accuracy of 
the first response and the consensus categories. We hypothesized that nonconsensual 
responses would be more likely to be changed than consensual responses. As can be 
seen from Table 1, the percentages of changes of consensual responses in CC and 
CW categories (that is, initial correct responses for CC items and initial incorrect 
responses for CW items) are 12.7% and 8.4%, respectively. The percentages of 
changes of nonconsensual responses in CC and CW categories (initial incorrect 
responses for CC items and initial correct responses for CW items) are 45.9% and 
54.8%, respectively. The percentages of changes of correct and incorrect initial 
responses in the NC category are 29.1% and 30.8%, respectively. In the next section, 
we present the analysis of proportions of answer change in relation to response 
consensuality, consensus categories, and item consensus.  
 
Direction of Change and Consensuality 
 
For each participant, we calculated the proportion of consensual and 
nonconsensual initial responses that were changed. Two items were excluded from 
the analysis because exactly 50% of participants provided each of two possible 
responses. Participants were more likely to change their nonconsensual initial 
responses (M = 0.47, SD = 0.26) than their consensual responses (M = 0.16, SD = 
0.12), t(69) = 10.17, p < .001. The obtained results provide support for the main 
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hypothesis, that is, nonconsensual responses were more likely to be changed than 
consensual responses.  
If participants are more likely to change their nonconsensual than their 
consensual responses, the proportions of change of initial correct and incorrect 
responses should vary between consensus categories. For each participant we 
calculated the proportion of change of accurate and inaccurate initial responses in 
each consensus category. Fourteen participants were excluded from the analysis 
because they failed to produce at least one incorrect response to CC items, and/or at 
least one correct response to CW items. In order to examine the effect of consensus 
categories (CC, CW, NC) and the accuracy of initial response (correct, incorrect) on 
the proportion of answer changes, we performed two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA. The main effects of consensus category, F(2,110) = 1.90, p > .05, and 
accuracy of the first response, F(1,55) = 1.28, p > .05, were not significant. However, 
their interaction was significant, F(2,110) = 50.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. As expected, 
the analysis of simple effects revealed that for CC items, the proportion of answer 
changes was higher for incorrect first responses (M = 0.50, SD = 0.42) than for 
correct first responses (M = 0.15, SD = 0.15), F(1,55) = 37.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. 
For CW items, the proportion of answer changes was higher for correct first 
responses (M = 0.59, SD = 0.33) than for incorrect first responses (M = 0.13, SD = 
0.16), F(1,55) = 75.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .58. For NC items there were no differences 
in the proportion of answer changes between correct (M = 0.28, SD = 0.27) and 
incorrect first responses (M = 0.31, SD = 0.26), F < 1. 
The observed differences in the proportion of answer changes between correct 
and incorrect initial responses affected overall accuracy of final responses in three 
consensus categories. Differences in accuracy between three consensus categories 
and response stage (initial and final responses) were analysed by two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA. The interaction between consensus categories and response 
stage was significant, F(2,138) = 14.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. For CW items, final 
responses provided after rethinking had lower accuracy (M = 0.20, SD = 0.18) than 
initial responses (M = 0.32, SD = 0.19), F(1,69) = 45.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. For CC 
items, accuracy of final responses (M = 0.76, SD = 0.19) was not significantly higher 
than accuracy of initial responses (M = 0.72, SD = 0.19), F(1,69) = 3.04, p = .09, ηp2 
= .04. In the set of NC items there were no differences in accuracy between initial 
(M = 0.50, SD = 0.17) and final responses (M = 0.51, SD = 0.16), F < 1.  
In the next analysis, we focused on the relationship between item consensus and 
probability of change of consensual and nonconsensual responses. For each of the 24 
items, we calculated item consensus (the proportion of participants who endorsed the 
consensual initial response), the proportion of change of initial consensual responses, 
the proportion of change of initial nonconsensual responses, and the proportion of 
change of all responses. Two items were excluded from the analysis because exactly 
50% of participants provided each of two possible responses. Figure 1 shows the 
percentages of change of the first response, separately for consensual and 




nonconsensual responses, and overall. For the sake of clarity, items were classified 
into four categories. First category included items with consensus between 51% and 
60%, the second category included items with consensus between 61% and 70%, the 
third category included items with consensus between 71% and 80%, and the fourth 
category included items with consensus higher than 81%.  
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of answer changes with respect to item consensus. 
 
 
The correlational analysis by items revealed that item consensus was negatively 
correlated with the overall proportion of change, r = -.56, p < .01. Items with higher 
consensus had lower probability of answer change. The probability of change of 
initial consensual responses also decreased with item consensus, r = -.56, p < .01. 
The proportion of answer changes of nonconsensual responses was highly correlated 
with item consensus, r = .88, p < .001. As the item consensus increased, the 
participants were more likely to change their nonconsensual responses.  
We also calculated differences in accuracy between final and initial responses 
for each item. Difference score ranged between -.19 and +.10. This difference 
correlated positively with accuracy of initial responses, r = .44, p < .05. Therefore, 
items with low initial accuracy, or CW items, tended to have lower accuracy of final 
responses compared to initial responses. Items with high initial accuracy, or CC 
items, tended to have higher accuracy of final responses.  
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The Analyses of Metacognitive Judgments and Response Times  
 
The final set of analyses was focused on metacognitive judgments and response 
times. We examined the role of initial response consensuality and response 
consistency in metacognitive judgments and response times. We classified each 
initial response with respect to consensuality (consensual, nonconsensual) and 
consistency (consistent, inconsistent). It should be noticed that consistent response 
included both 11 and 00 responses, and inconsistent responses included both 01 and 
10 responses. For each participant we computed mean metacognitive judgments 
(FOR and FJC) and mean response times for the first and the second response, for 
each of four combinations of consensuality and consistency. Nineteen participants 
were excluded from the analyses because they failed to provide at least one response 
in each of the four combinations of consensuality and consistency. Descriptive data 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Mean Metacognitive Judgments and Response Times (SDs are Given in Parentheses)  
 Consensual first response Nonconsensual first response 
 Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent 
FOR 70.92 (12.09) 67.09 (12.16) 68.62 (12.61) 62.68 (11.58) 
FJC 86.38  (9.81) 77.67 (11.20) 81.03 (12.03) 82.97  (9.57) 
RT1(sec) 10.02  (3.89) 10.48   (5.99) 10.15  (3.52) 10.80  (4.89) 
RT2(sec) 15.70  (6.23) 22.30 (11.16) 18.39  (8.58) 19.35  (7.99) 
Note. Non-transformed response times are presented.  
 
The data were analysed with two-way repeated measures ANOVAs. To analyse 
response times, log10 transformation was used.  
FOR was higher for consensual (M = 69.01, SD = 11.08) than for nonconsensual 
responses (M = 65.65, SD = 10.89), F(1,50) = 16.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, and it was 
higher for consistent (M = 69.77, SD = 11.84) than for inconsistent responses (M = 
64.89, SD = 10.83), F(1,50) = 18.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. The interaction between 
consensuality and consistency was not significant, F(1,50) = 1.52, p > .05.  
For the response times of initial responses, neither the main effects of 
consensuality and consistency nor their interaction approached significance (all ps > 
.12). However, it should be noted that initial response times were negatively 
correlated with FOR in the analysis by items, r = -.70, p < .001, indicating the effect 
of fluency of processing on FOR.  
FJC was higher for consistent responses (M = 83.70, SD = 9.91) than for 
inconsistent responses (M = 80.32, SD = 8.81), F(1,50) = 11.97, p < .01, ηp2 = .19. 
Although the main effect of consensuality of initial response on FJC was not 
significant, F < 1, the interaction between consistency and consensuality was 
significant, F(1,50) = 20.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. Similar pattern of results was 




obtained for response times of final responses. Final consistent responses were given 
more quickly (M = 17.05, SD = 6.46) than final inconsistent responses (M = 20.83, 
SD = 8.21), F(1,50) = 26.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Again, although the main effect of 
consensuality of initial response was not significant, F < 1, the interaction between 
consistency and consensuality was significant, F(1,50) = 13.37, p < .01, ηp2 = .21. 
The analysis of simple effects confirmed that consensual consistent responses had 
higher FJC than nonconsensual consistent responses, F(1,50) = 16.34, p < .001, ηp2 
= .25, and were given more quickly than nonconsensual responses, F(1,50) = 5.40, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .10. Final inconsistent consensual responses (that is, final responses in 
trials in which initial nonconsensual responses were changed) were given more 
quickly than final inconsistent nonconsensual responses, F(1, 50) = 6.29, p < .05, ηp2 





In this study, we analysed the effects of response consensuality on patterns of 
answer change by using the two-response paradigm with syllogistic problems. We 
observed that the probability of change of initial response is related to the 
consensuality of that response. More precisely, there are three key findings.  
First, initial consensual responses, that is, responses endorsed by a larger 
proportion of participants, were more likely to be repeated as final responses. Initial 
nonconsensual responses were more likely to be changed. Furthermore, the 
probability of answer change correlated with item consensus. As the item consensus 
increases, there is a larger proportion of consensual responses, and the probability of 
change of those responses decreases. On the contrary, as the proportion of 
nonconsensual responses decreases, the probability of change of those responses 
increases.  
Second, when all items were taken into the analysis, normative accuracy of 
initial responses was not related to the probability of answer change, or, to response 
consistency. Participants were equally likely to change their initial correct and 
incorrect responses across the whole set of items. However, the proportion of 
responses in inconsistent 10 and 01 categories differed between three consensus 
categories. For NC items, participants were equally likely to change their initial 
correct and incorrect responses. For CC and CW items participants were more likely 
to change their nonconsensual responses than their consensual responses. As a 
consequence, there is a higher probability of change of nonconsensual initial 
incorrect responses than consensual initial correct responses given to CC items, and 
the opposite pattern holds for CW items. We also observed that the accuracy of final 
responses tended to change toward consensual responses, or, to increase for CC items 
and to decrease for CW items, although this change was small. Therefore, observed 
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changes of responses were substantially associated with consensuality of initial 
responses, regardless of their normative accuracy.  
Third, the findings about metacognitive judgments (FOR and FJC) and response 
times largely replicate the results of previous studies (Bago & De Neys, 2017; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson et al., 
2011), providing further evidence for the robustness of these results. In short, FOR 
judgments predicted the probability of answer change and rethinking times. Both 
types of metacognitive judgments were higher for consistent than for inconsistent 
responses. Although we did not find the correlation between fluency and the 
probability of answer change, fluency was correlated with FOR. In addition, our 
study showed that metacognitive judgments and response times of final responses 
also track consensuality of initial responses. Namely, both types of metacognitive 
judgments were lower for nonconsensual than for consensual responses. When initial 
nonconsensual responses were changed to consensual responses, rethinking was 
associated with higher confidence and it was faster than when initial consensual 
responses were changed to nonconsensual responses.   
All observed effects clearly correspond to the findings reported by Koriat in his 
studies that included multiple presentations of identical items (Koriat, 2008, 2011, 
2013; Koriat & Adiv, 2011, 2012; Koriat & Sorka, 2015). In these studies consensual 
responses were more likely to be consistent, that is, to be repeated on the following 
encounters with the item. Consistent responding was also associated with higher 
confidence and shorter response latencies. It can be stressed again that these findings 
are very reliable across domains as different as general knowledge, perceptual 
judgments, personal preferences, judgments of category membership, attitudinal 
judgments, and social beliefs. An interpretation of these results within the SCM 
framework is based on the hypothetical process of representation sampling from the 
shared pool of representations associated with an item. Larger the proportion of 
representations that favours the consensual response, the process of representation 
sampling will result in a larger proportion of participants endorsing the consensual 
response, and in higher consistency of responding at the intraindividual level.  
We previously demonstrated that confidence judgments in syllogistic reasoning 
systematically varied with respect to item consensus and response consensuality 
(Bajšanski et al., 2018). The results of the present study showed that the probability 
of repeating (and changing) the response provided at the first response stage, is 
related to consensuality in a similar way, just as it can be expected on the basis of the 
SCM. These findings provide further support for the applicability of the SCM in the 
domain of reasoning, and for the generality and robustness of the model.  
Why people sometimes change their initial response when given an opportunity 
to solve the problem for the second time? According to the interpretation by 
Thompson et al. (2011; see also Thompson, 2009; Thompson & Johnson, 2014), 
answer change is primarily determined by the intervention of Type 2 processes. Low 
FOR has a crucial role in the willingness to engage deliberate rethinking. As a 




consequence, more time is spent on rethinking, and, occasionally, different final 
response is given. There is strong evidence that supports this view: low FOR is 
related to longer rethinking times, and to higher probability of answer change. 
Our results offer an additional possible route to answer change: random 
fluctuations in representation sampling, or generating evidence for each of the two 
response options. Different response opportunities may lead to different responses as 
a consequence of different outcomes of the sampling process, and resulting evidence 
favouring each of the two response options. If this is the case, answer change will 
occur even without the intervention of qualitatively different Type 2 processes.  
A negative correlation between FOR and rethinking times may indicate 
engagement of Type 2 processes. On the other hand, this correlation may also reflect 
the effects of self-consistency. Koriat (2012) suggested that the duration of the 
sampling process is determined by the consistency of sampling, and, as a 
consequence, that more consistent sampling terminates faster. For example, when 
engaging items with low self-consistency, initial responses should be given low FOR 
and they should have longer response latencies. During the second response 
opportunity, these items should also elicit longer response times. Therefore, the 
relation between FOR and rethinking times does not have to be a causal one. As a 
further piece of evidence, when our participants were changing their responses, they 
were faster when their second response was consensual than when it was 
nonconsensual.  
Following the same logic, the relationship between FOR and answer change 
may also be a consequence of fluctuations in the sampling process. Items with low 
self-consistency should have lower item consensus, they should be assigned lower 
FOR, and they should have a higher probability of response change. This speculation 
is supported by the strong negative correlation between item consensus and the 
probability of answer change of consensual responses, and a strong positive 
correlation between item consensus and probability of answer change of 
nonconsensual responses.     
 To summarize, we speculate that there are two possible routes to answer 
change. First route is via FOR and analytic engagement. Responses that are generated 
without strong evidence will be accompanied by the feeling of metacognitive 
uncertainty (Quayle & Ball, 2000; Thompson, 2009) which will trigger more careful 
rethinking and will engage analytic Type 2 processes, with rationalization and 
decoupling as potential outcomes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Pennycook, Fugelsang, 
& Koehler, 2015). Second route is via random fluctuations in representation 
sampling. Responses that are generated without strong evidence will often be 
nonconsensual responses, responses given to items with low item consensus, and 
they will be followed by low FOR. Second presentation of the item will restart the 
sampling process, with all the consequences described before. However, it should be 
also noticed that generating the second response is surely not independent from the 
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initial response, since participants can base their second decision on the remembered 
initial response. 
To connect the results of this study to the literature on dual-process theory 
(Evans & Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999), the 
obtained results can be related to current dual process models that propose multiple 
Type 1 processes (Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys, 2017; Pennycook et al., 2015). 
According to these models, when participants attempt to solve conflict problems, 
Type 1 processes can cue several responses or give rise to two different intuitions, 
one logical, and one heuristic. Comparative strength of initial intuitions determines 
the initial response, as well as the engagement of Type 2 processes. In particular, 
according to Bago and DeNeys (2017), stronger intuition determines which of two 
response options will be endorsed. The relative strength of two intuitions determine 
the probability of answer change: larger the difference in strength between two 
intuitions, smaller the probability of answer change. Therefore, normative responses 
are not reachable only by Type 2 processes, but by quick intuitions as well. Similarly, 
in a recent study, Newman, Gibb, and Thompson (2017) showed that quick responses 
were affected by the rules of probability, and slow responses by belief-based 
information, contrary to common assumption that belief-based reasoning is fast and 
characteristic for Type 1 processes, and that rule-based reasoning is slow and requires 
Type 2 processes. There is a growing body of research with similar findings (De 
Neys, 2014; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Handley, 
Newstead, & Trippas, 2011).   
These findings and theoretical accounts can be related to the view that initial 
responses are determined by the strength of evidence favouring each response option. 
Importantly, we speculate that this evidence is obtained by sampling from the shared 
pool of representations, both for initial and final responses. The hypothetical pool of 
representations comprises all possible pieces of evidence that may affect response 
choice. It can be further argued that task demands and individual differences may 
affect the availability of different pieces of evidence. For example, instructions to 
answer quickly may increase availability of belief-based information (Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes, 2005), working memory load may affect the availability of rule-
based information (De Neys, 2006), and individual differences in cognitive capacity 
and disposition to think analytically may affect the sensitivity to normative 
information (Stanovich & West, 1998; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Toplak, West, 
& Stanovich, 2011; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008).  
As a final consideration, the results of this study have methodological 
implications. The obtained results indicate self-consistency as a factor that affects 
answer change. Inconsistent responding may not be a consequence of the 
engagement of Type 2 processes and careful rethinking, but a consequence of 
random fluctuations in generating evidence during two encounters with an item. 
Therefore, additional controls are needed to differentiate the potential effects of Type 
2 processes from random fluctuations in decisions about the options. For example, 




results obtained with two-response paradigm could be compared to the consistency 
of responding on multiple opportunities to give intuitive responses. Another 
methodological implication concerns properties of items used. Across different 
domains, items with different consensus elicit different patterns of responding, 
including differences in metacognitive judgments, consistency of responding, and 
response times. Therefore, careful examination of properties of items used, including 
distributions of consensual and nonconsensual responses and their accuracy should 
be an important initial step in studying metacognitive judgments and consistency of 
responding in the domain of reasoning. 
To conclude, the results of this study provide further support for the relevance 
of the SCM in a domain of reasoning. Patterns of answer change, as well as 
metacognitive judgments and response times, were clearly related to item consensus 
and response consensuality. However, our findings are of limited generality, since 
we used only one type of problems, syllogistic reasoning problems, to test our 
predictions. Further studies should examine the generalizability of obtained results, 
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